Jeffrey Sachs on How the Neocons Have Destroyed U.S. Global Dominance

Jeffrey Sachs on How the Neocons Have Destroyed U.S. Global Dominance

17 November 2025, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)

On November 15th and 16th Jeffrey Sachs gave two lectures on how the U.S. Government’s obsession to dominate the whole world is instead isolating the U.S. globally, and driving even America’s allies to consider breaking away. Here is, first, on the 16th, the impacts upon the U.S. versus Russia, China, and Iran; then on the 15th, the impacts causing Japan to face the choice to either continue with the U.S. as it now is doing, or else break away from it and become instead allied with China, which has been its main trading-partner:

“A New Tech Cold War: Russia, China, Brazil Break Free from Silicon Valley !! Prof . Jeffrey Sachs”

16 November 2025

0:00

Russia may be preparing to end US

0:03

digital hegemony on its territory.

0:05

Welcome ladies and gentlemen. Join me

0:07

today. For more than two decades, the

0:10

United States maintained not only

0:13

military preeminence but also a sweeping

0:15

form of digital hegemony built through

0:18

Silicon Valley platforms that encircled

0:20

the globe. Google mapped uh the world’s

0:24

information. Apple defined the global

0:27

hardware standard. Android became the

0:30

operating system of entire continents.

0:34

Samsung deeply integrated with USIsraeli

0:38

supply chains dominated consumer

0:40

electronics in emerging markets. This

0:43

ecosystem formed a what could be called

0:45

the American digital order. A system of

0:48

influence that was subtler than

0:50

traditional geopolitics but far more

0:52

pervasive. That era is now visibly

0:55

fracturing. Russia’s preparations to

0:58

shut down Google, Android, Apple, and

1:01

Samsung, framed openly as counter

1:04

measures against espionage threats from

1:07

the United States and Israel, signal the

1:10

latest and most dramatic step in a

1:13

broader trend. The global revolt against

1:16

US centric technology. What began as

1:20

quiet discomfort in China has expanded

1:24

to skepticism in Brazil, India, Turkey,

1:27

the Middle East, and now Russia. The

1:29

discontent is not ideological but

1:32

structural. States increasingly

1:34

understand that dependence on American

1:36

digital platforms exposes them to

1:39

unpredictable political pressure, data

1:42

extraction, and asymmetric surveillance

1:44

capacity. This shift is not accidental.

1:47

It emerges from years of accumulating

1:51

distrust. Edward Snowden’s 2013

1:55

revelations exposed how deeply US

1:59

intelligence agencies were embedded

2:01

within global telecom networks, cloud

2:04

services, and consumer devices. Later

2:08

disclosures about uh Israel’s Pegasus

2:11

spyw wear further convinced governments

2:13

that western technology giants were

2:16

vulnerable to exploitation or were

2:18

complicit partners. For many states,

2:21

this was a turning point, the

2:22

realization that commercial technology

2:24

could serve as a dualuse mechanism for

2:27

covert political manipulation.

2:30

The result is a growing perception that

2:32

American tech firms are not neutral

2:35

global utilities, but strategic

2:37

extensions of US power actors that can

2:40

be weaponized during geopolitical

2:42

crisis, the removal of apps in response

2:46

to sanctions, the cut off of cloud

2:48

access for blacklisted countries, the

2:51

manipulation of app stores, and the

2:53

politicization of content moderation all

2:56

reinforce the view that US digital

2:59

platforms function within Washington’s

3:02

foreign policy orbit. For nations

3:04

seeking autonomy, this dependence is no

3:07

longer acceptable. Russia’s shift

3:10

therefore represents something larger

3:12

than a national security response. It is

3:15

it is part of a worldwide movement

3:18

toward digital non-alignment. The

3:21

emergence of parallel sovereign

3:23

technological ecosystems.

3:26

China has built an entire great digital

3:29

wall, Huawei, Harmony OS, WeChat Pay,

3:32

Alicloud and proprietary chip supply

3:35

chains. India is experimenting with bar

3:38

OS and local payment interfaces.

3:41

Brazil is redesigning its digital

3:44

governance architecture. Even US allies

3:47

such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and

3:49

France now openly discuss the need for

3:51

strategic technological independence.

3:54

The political logic is clear. In an era

3:57

where data is power, no nation wants to

4:00

live under the shadow of a foreign

4:02

surveillance apparatus. Russia, China,

4:04

and Brazil are not rejecting American

4:08

technology because it is inferior, but

4:11

because it is too powerful, too

4:13

intrusive, and too politically entangled

4:15

with Washington’s strategic agenda. We

4:18

are witnessing the end of an era in

4:21

which American platforms were treated as

4:24

benign global infrastructure. They are

4:27

now viewed through the lens of national

4:29

security, geopolitical competition, and

4:32

strategic vulnerability. And the

4:35

consequences of this shift will

4:37

reverberate across the global digital

4:40

landscape for decades to come. Russia’s

4:43

decision to prepare the shutdown of

4:45

Google, Android, Apple, and Samsung is

4:48

not a reaction born from paranoia, or an

4:51

impulsive geopolitical gesture. It is

4:54

the culmination of a strategic doctrine

4:56

forged through a decade of confrontation

4:59

with the West, one in which digital

5:01

sovereignty has become as essential as

5:04

territorial security or energy

5:06

independence. To understand the

5:08

political logic behind Moscow’s move, we

5:11

must see it through the prism of three

5:13

intertwined motives. Sovereignty,

5:16

retaliation, and long-term systemic

5:18

redesign. First, sovereignty. Since the

5:21

early 2010 seconds, Russia has grown

5:24

increasingly skeptical of foreign

5:26

controlled digital infrastructure. The

5:29

Snowden disclosures devastated Moscow’s

5:32

trust in American telecommunications and

5:34

cloud services. The subsequent

5:36

integration of Israeli and US

5:39

intelligence linked software into

5:42

consumer electronics, sometimes embedded

5:44

at the firmware level, reinforced the

5:47

belief that American tech is inseparable

5:50

from American power. From Russia’s

5:53

perspective, any device running Google

5:55

services or Apple’s proprietary OS is in

5:59

effect a potential listening post.

6:02

Whether such fears are exaggerated is

6:04

irrelevant politically. What matters is

6:07

the perception that western platforms

6:10

can be activated or weaponized during

6:13

moments of crisis for a country engaged

6:17

in open geopolitical conflict with the

6:19

United States tolerating such

6:21

vulnerabilities would be strategically

6:24

irresponsible. Second retaliation.

6:27

Russia has been subjected to some of the

6:29

most sweeping technological sanctions in

6:32

modern history. American companies have

6:35

cut software updates, halted cloud

6:38

services, and banned access to app

6:41

stores. US allies have blocked chip

6:45

exports. These actions demonstrated to

6:48

Moscow how easily Washington can turn

6:52

technological integration into a

6:54

political weapon. Thus, Russia’s move is

6:57

also a symmetric response. If the West

6:59

uses technology for coercion, Russia

7:02

will build systems immune to that

7:04

leverage. Banning US and US aligned

7:08

devices is in this sense a mirror

7:10

strategy, one that seeks to deprive

7:13

Washington of consumer market influence

7:15

while strengthening Russia’s domestic

7:17

digital base. Third, systemic redesign.

7:21

Russia is not merely uh removing foreign

7:24

technology. It is attempting to build a

7:27

new digital architecture.

7:30

This includes developing Aurora OS to

7:32

replace Android, expanding Yandex as the

7:35

dominant search and cloud platform,

7:37

accelerating domestic semiconductor

7:39

programs despite sanctions, localizing

7:42

payments and fintech systems,

7:44

integrating digital sovereignty into the

7:47

Eurasian Economic Union. This ecosystem

7:50

building effort signals something

7:52

profound. Russia is preparing for a

7:55

world where global technological

7:57

integration collapses, replaced by

8:00

regional digital blocks. Politically,

8:03

the message is unmistakable. Russia

8:05

believes that dependence on western

8:07

digital infrastructure is incompatible

8:09

with national survival as long as US

8:12

foreign policy remains confrontational.

8:14

Moscow wants to demonstrate that a

8:17

significant power can break free from

8:19

Silicon Valley, encouraging other

8:21

nations to consider similar paths. In

8:25

that sense, Russia’s decision carries an

8:27

ideological dimension, a vision of a

8:29

multipolar digital world where the

8:32

United States no longer dictates the

8:34

terms of connectivity, data flows, or

8:36

technological norms. For Washington, the

8:39

implications are troubling. A precedent

8:42

has been set. If Russia succeeds in

8:44

replacing Apple, Google, and Samsung,

8:47

the myth of the indispensable American

8:50

tech ecosystem will be shattered. And

8:52

once one significant power exits the

8:55

system, others may follow. For much of

8:58

the early 21st century, analysts spoke

9:00

of American technology as if it were an

9:03

immutable law of nature, an inevitable

9:05

global standard that no nation could

9:08

replace or resist. Google, Apple,

9:10

Android, and the broader Silicon Valley

9:13

ecosystem were treated not merely as

9:16

corporate actors, but as pillars of a

9:18

globalized world built around US norms,

9:21

US data channels and US corporate

9:24

governance. This dominance created a

9:27

powerful illusion that technological

9:30

supremacy was self- sustaining,

9:32

insulated from politics. But today, that

9:35

illusion is collapsing. The United

9:38

States remains innovative, but its

9:40

global control is steadily eroding.

9:43

Russia’s dramatic break from Google and

9:46

Apple is not the cause of this decline,

9:48

but a prominent symptom of it. The

9:50

fragmentation began slowly with China’s

9:53

digital sovereign model and has now

9:56

accelerated into a global trend that

9:58

threatens the very core of America’s

10:01

technological empire. To understand the

10:04

scope of this decline, we must examine

10:06

the structural pillars of US tech

10:08

dominance and how each has weakened.

10:11

One, global market access now fractured

10:14

a decade ago. US tech giants operated

10:18

nearly everywhere, capturing billions of

10:21

users. Today, China is closed. Russia is

10:26

uh decoupling. Iran has banned or

10:29

heavily restricted Western platforms.

10:32

India and Brazil are building local

10:34

alternatives and sovereign digital

10:36

rules. Gulf states are increasingly

10:39

adopting Chinese cloud and surveillance

10:41

systems. The world’s largest and fastest

10:44

growing markets now operate outside or

10:47

at the margins of US tech influence.

10:51

This fragmentation directly undermines

10:54

Silicon Valley’s ability to set global

10:57

norms. Two, operating system dominance

11:00

no longer unchallenged. Android and iOS

11:03

once held near total control. That

11:06

control has been broken. China’s Harmony

11:08

OS has surpassed 100 million users and

11:11

is expanding abroad. Russia’s Aurora OS

11:15

is gaining state backing as a national

11:17

standard. India’s bar OS aims to reduce

11:20

dependency on foreign systems. Several

11:23

Azion states are pursuing their own

11:25

secure OS initiatives. The belief that

11:28

the world would forever revolve around

11:31

Google Play and Apple’s App Store is no

11:33

longer credible. Three, cloud monopoly

11:37

rapidly weakening. US domination of

11:40

cloud computing, AWS, Google Cloud,

11:44

Microsoft Azure was a cornerstone of

11:46

surveillance, data access and

11:48

geopolitical leverage. But now China has

11:51

Alibaba cloud and Huawei cloud both of

11:54

which are expanding globally. Russia is

11:57

building national cloud sovereignty. The

12:00

EU is developing Gaia X to escape US and

12:05

Chinese control. Saudi Arabia, the UAE

12:09

and Turkey are constructing sovereign

12:12

cloud regions. The world is moving from

12:15

a unipolar cloud system to a multi-olar

12:18

cloud constellation. Four AI leadership

12:23

being challenged head-on. The US still

12:26

leads in foundational AI models, but

12:28

China has closed the gap in applied AI

12:31

across surveillance, industrial

12:33

automation, fintech, drones, and

12:35

logistics. For many governments outside

12:38

the West, Chinese AI tools are more

12:41

affordable, more exportable, and free

12:43

from US political constraints. Five,

12:47

payments and financial control no longer

12:49

guaranteed app store fees, Visa,

12:52

Mastercard networks, and US controlled

12:55

digital payment infrastructure long gave

12:58

Washington extraordinary leverage. Now,

13:01

India’s UPI is becoming a global

13:04

standard. China’s digital yuan offers a

13:07

parallel financial architecture.

13:10

Russia’s MIR card and domestic payment

13:13

rails operate independently. The fusion

13:16

of payments and geopolitics is

13:18

weakening, undermining a central

13:20

instrument of US influence. The

13:23

weakening of US tech supremacy is not

13:27

just a market shift. It is a

13:29

geopolitical reset. States increasingly

13:32

view American technology as a liability,

13:35

too politicized, too dominant, too

13:37

vulnerable to weaponization. The more

13:39

Washington uses sanctions and digital

13:42

control mechanisms, the faster nations

13:44

move to build alternatives, the irony is

13:47

evident. US attempts to maintain

13:49

techgemony have accelerated its

13:51

fragmentation. For decades, the United

13:54

States maintained extraordinary global

13:57

influence, not through force, but

14:00

through the everyday tools people

14:02

carried in their pockets. An iPhone in

14:04

——

“Japan’s Biggest Mistake? Beijing Issues a Threat the World Can’t Ignore—Prof. Sachs”

15 November 2025

0:00

Right now, Japan and China uh are entering the most dangerous moment in

0:06

Asia since the Cold War. Yet, almost nobody is paying attention. Beijing has

0:11

issued a warning that uh if ignored could push two nuclearbacked powers

0:19

toward conflict with global consequences. Stay with me because understanding this

0:26

crisis is not optional. Our peace, our economy, and the future of Asia depend

0:33

on what happens next. China responds harshly to Japan for actions related to

0:38

Taiwan. Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. Join me today. Prime Minister Takisai’s

0:43

rise to power marks a turning point in Japan’s postcold war foreign policy. For decades, uh, Tokyo sought to balance

0:52

realism and restraint, threading a delicate line between economic

0:59

interdependence with China and strategic dependence on the United States. That

1:05

dual track strategy engagement with Beijing alongside quiet alignment with Washington was the foundation of

1:12

Japanese diplomacy from the late 1,00 uh 992ns through the early 2020s.

1:20

But the Takayichi government represents the moment when this balancing act

1:26

became untenable. Japan today stands at a strategic crossroads confronted by uh

1:33

a more assertive uh China uh a rapidly shifting uh Indo-Pacific order uh and a

1:42

domestic political landscape that increasingly favors uh hardline

1:49

approaches. Takayichi is not simply another uh conservative

1:56

prime minister. uh she is the political expression of uh a more profound shift

2:04

within Japanese society and its policymaking elite. There is a a growing

2:11

belief that the post-war pacifist compact has reached the limits of its

2:16

usefulness uh and that Japan must act with greater clarity uh and uh

2:23

capability in defending its regional interests. Uh the the geopolitical

2:29

context amplifies this transformation. China’s military posture around Taiwan

2:36

and the East China Sea has intensified year after year, gradually eroding uh

2:42

the assumptions on which earlier Japanese governments built their China

2:47

policy, air naval incursions near the Skaku Islands, increasingly

2:52

sophisticated PLA military exercises, and Beijing’s deepening strategic

2:58

partnership with Russia have collectively reshaped Tokyo’s threat. perceptions for many in Japan’s security

3:07

establishment. Uh the question is no longer whether China will challenge the

3:13

regional order uh but how prepared Japan must be when it does. Uh this uh tension

3:20

reached a new peak in November 2025 when the Chinese foreign ministry uh warned

3:27

that uh any Japanese involvement in a Taiwan conflict uh would be treated as

3:35

aggression uh and met with decisive retaliation. Uh the uh message was uh

3:43

unmistakably direct and uh unusually confrontational, marking one of the most

3:49

severe uh warnings Beijing has issued to Tokyo in decades for the Takahi

3:56

government. This confirmed what they had long believed diplomacy without credible

4:02

deterrence would invite more pressure, not less. From Tokyo’s perspective, the

4:09

Taiwan issue is not merely a matter of solidarity with democratic partners. It

4:15

is a tangible national security concern. Japan’s southwestern islands stretching

4:22

from uh Kyushu to Okinawa sit uncomfortably close to the Taiwan

4:29

Strait. In Japanese strategic thinking, uh, a Chinese takeover of Taiwan could

4:38

fundamentally uh, alter the military balance in the Western Pacific. Uh, enabling Beijing to

4:46

project power deep into Japanese territory and maritime lanes. uh this

4:52

would place Japan in a precarious position dependent on the United States

4:58

at a moment when American strategic bandwidth uh is uh increasingly

5:04

stretched across Europe and the Middle East. Uh the Takahayichi government stance therefore emerges not from

5:11

ideology alone but from a structural reading of uh the international

5:16

environment. Japan sees itself as compelled by geography uh history and

5:25

shifting power balances to adopt a more explicit posture of deterrence. The

5:33

question is not why Takahi is hard on China uh but why earlier leaders believe

5:41

Japan could afford not to be as this report unfolds. uh we examine not only

5:47

Tokyo’s motivations but also Beijing’s potential reactions reactions uh uh that

5:56

uh could either stabilize or further destabilize an already fragile uh

6:03

Indo-Pacific order to understand why Prime Minister Takan has embraced one of

6:09

the toughest China policies in modern Japanese history. It is essential to see

6:16

the structural forces beneath her political ascent. Her posture is not

6:22

simply a matter of ideology or personal conviction. It reflects the convergence

6:30

of national anxieties, economic recalibration and strategic realities

6:36

that have accumulated over nearly two decades. The first driver is a profound

6:42

transformation inside Japan’s political class. The long dominance of pragmatic

6:49

conservatives, uh, leaders who valued economic ties with China and prioritize

6:55

stability has started to erode. a newer generation of policy makers shaped by

7:02

repeated crises in the East China Sea uh and disillusioned by uh China’s

7:08

assertiveness has taken the stage in this context. Taki is not an anomaly but

7:15

the embodiment of an emerging consensus among uh national security thinkers. Uh

7:23

Japan must move past its post-war constraints. Takahi’s political base

7:29

believes the pacifist framework that once kept Japan stable now leaves it vulnerable. In their view, uh, China’s

7:37

rise has rendered ambiguity dangerous.

7:42

Hesitation only encourages coercion. This doctrinal shift toward proactive

7:51

deterrence is the core of Taki’s foreign policy philosophy. The second driver is

7:58

Japan’s fear of strategic encirclement. China’s uh military growth combined with

8:06

its assertive behavior near the Skaku Islands has fundamentally altered uh

8:13

Tokyo’s uh threat calculus. Uh the PLA Navy now conducts regular operations in

8:21

waters Japan considers vital to its national defense. Meanwhile, uh Joint

8:27

Russia China patrols in the Sea of Japan add a second northern layer of pressure.

8:32

What used to be abstract concerns are now weekly operational realities. Uh

8:39

Japanese uh defense planners increasingly argue that China’s long-term aim is to push the US out of

8:48

East Asia and establish a hierarchical regional order. If Washington’s

8:54

influence weakens Japan, geographically exposed and demographically aging would

8:59

be left to manage China’s power primarily on its own. uh thus uh taking

9:06

a more rigid stance is not seen as aggression but as preemptive self-preservation.

9:11

Uh the third driver is Taiwan centrality in Japan’s strategic thinking. The

9:17

Taiwan Strait is no longer viewed merely as a flash point. It is perceived as the

9:23

fulcrum upon which Japan’s own security hinges. If Taiwan were to fall under

9:30

Chinese control, Beijing would uh have military access to the open Pacific and

9:37

direct proximity to Okinawa. Uh this would undermine Japan’s maritime defense

9:45

uh disrupt its shipping routes and weaken the US Japan alliance. Hence uh

9:51

Japan sees Taiwan not through uh ideological lenses but through a complex

9:57

calculus of survival. Uh the fourth driver is Japan’s deliberate uh economic

10:04

hedging against China. Uh over the last decade major Japanese firms have

10:11

diversified supply chains to Southeast Asia, India uh and the US. the uh

10:18

semiconductor sector uh especially Japan’s role uh in advanced lithography

10:26

and uh advanced materials has become strategically intertwined with western

10:33

efforts to slow China’s technological ascent. This diversification gives Tokyo

10:40

more diplomatic freedom, reducing the fear of economic retaliation.

10:45

Finally, US strategic expectations play a substantial role. Washington wants

10:53

Japan to assume greater responsibility in regional security, especially as the

11:00

US faces simultaneous challenges in Europe and the Middle East. Takichi’s

11:06

government aligns closely with this American vision uh making Japan a

11:12

central pillar of the Indo-Pacific deterrence architecture. Taken together,

11:18

these factors explain why Takayichi’s China policy is not a departure from

11:25

Japanese interests. It is their logical, if assertive evolution. China views

11:31

Japan’s newly assertive foreign policy through a lens shaped by history,

11:37

nationalism, and strategic competition. From Beijing’s perspective, uh, Takiichi

11:44

Sai’s hardline approach is not merely a policy shift, but a structural challenge

11:49

to China’s regional aspirations and to the narrative that China is the rightful

11:56

central power of East Asia. Uh, understanding how China interprets

12:02

Japan’s posture uh is essential for grasping why Beijing’s rhetoric has

12:08

grown so sharp and why escalation risks are rising. First, Beijing sees Japan’s

12:15

pivot as a deliberate alignment with the US containment strategy. Chinese

12:22

analysts routinely argue that Washington’s Indo-Pacific framework depends on reviving Japan as a frontline

12:31

military actor. Uh in their view, uh Tokyo’s support for Taiwan, uh its

12:37

increased defense spending uh and its willingness to host new American missile systems all serve a singular purpose. uh

12:45

maintaining uh US primacy and uh constraining uh China’s uh influence to

12:53

uh Beijing uh Takiichi’s uh policies are not merely independent Japanese

13:00

decisions. They are interpreted as part of a larger US orchestrated architecture

13:07

designed to hinder China’s reunification with Taiwan and limit its maritime

13:13

access to the Pacific. Second, China views Japan’s growing involvement in

13:20

Taiwan as an existential challenge. Taiwan is not a peripheral issue for

13:27

Beijing. It is the central axis of its national identity, political legitimacy

13:34

and long-term strategic vision. Any foreign involvement in the Taiwan

13:39

question is treated as interference in China’s internal affairs and Japanese

13:45

involvement is especially sensitive. uh China’s November 2025

13:53

warning that Japanese intervention would be treated as aggression and met with

13:58

decisive retaliation is not simply diplomatic bluster. It reflects

14:04

Beijing’s deep fear that a militarily capable US aligned Japan could derail

14:11

its timeline for reunification. Japan’s strategic geography only

14:17

amplifies this concern. From the PLA’s viewpoint, Japanese bases in Okinawa and

14:24

Kyushu could play a decisive role in any Taiwan conflict uh offering airspace uh

14:33

logistical support uh and anti-ship capabilities that could block or slow uh

14:39

a Chinese invasion. Third, Beijing activates historical narratives because

14:46

they remain politically potent. Uh, China’s political leadership frequently

14:53

invokes Japan’s wartime history, framing contemporary Japanese military expansion

15:00

as a return to militarism. This narrative is not merely retrospective

15:06

propaganda. It is a powerful tool that uh reinforces domestic legitimacy,

15:14

mobilizes nationalist sentiment, and justifies a more rigid uh stance toward

15:22

Tokyo. By accusing Japan of uh failing to reflect on historical crimes, Beijing

15:29

taps into deeply embedded societal memories, strengthening its political

15:34

position at home while discrediting Japan internationally. Fourth, uh China perceives an emerging

15:43

integrated security network among the US, Japan uh and Taiwan. this uh triad

15:51

uh economic, technological and military is seen in Beijing as a direct challenge

16:00

to China’s long-term ambitions. uh the cooperation on semiconductors, joint

16:07

military exercises, ballistic missile integration uh and Japan’s

16:13

reinterpretation of uh collective self-defense all point to uh a

16:20

coordinated strategy to Chinese strategists. This network threatens to

16:27

box China into the South China Sea and limit its access to the broader Pacific.

16:34

Finally, uh domestic political dynamics shape China’s interpretation. Uh the

16:42

Chinese leadership cannot appear passive in the face of Japanese assertiveness

16:48

without risking nationalist backlash. Standing firm against Japan is

16:54

politically advantageous and symbolically necessary amid slowing economic growth, rising public

17:01

discontent and heightened uh nationalism. Uh in some Beijing views,

17:08

Japan’s new posture uh not as a defensive adjustment but as a strategic

17:15

challenge uh aimed at containing its rise. This perception will shape how

17:22

China responds. Sometimes forcefully, sometimes asymmetrically as Japan

17:27

continues to harden its stance. If Japan under Taki Sai continues its assertive

17:35

trajectory, strengthening military ties with the United States, uh, openly

17:41

supporting Taiwan and expanding its defense capabilities, China is unlikely

17:46

to remain a passive observer. Beijing’s response will be calibrated rather than

17:53

reckless, guided by a dual logic. Apply pressure to deter Japan while avoiding

17:59

steps that could trigger uncontrollable conflict with the US. Understanding

18:05

these likely responses is essential to mapping the future of East Asian security. at one intensified military

18:14

signaling in the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The most uh immediate and

18:21

visible response will be in the military domain. China will escalate air and

18:28

naval operations near the Skaku Islands, increasing the frequency uh and

18:34

complexity of incursions into Japan’s air defense identification zone.

18:39

SUPPLEMENT:

The best analysis I’ve seen of the U.S. November 3rd election results is Robert Barnes’s

.

It analyzes domestic American politics in basically the same way that Sachs, in those two lectures, analyzed international American policies.

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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.