John Mearsheimer Explains Why China Will Lead the World

30 October 2025, posted by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)

“China’s Rare Earth Empire Has Already Trapped the United States! | John Mearsheimer”

28 October 2025, Military Chessboard

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[Every] international system has relied on some strategic foundation beneath its

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military and diplomatic reach. In the 19th century, it was coal and steel. In

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the 20th century, it was oil and uranium. In the 21st century, it is rare

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earth elements, the hidden materials embedded in every piece of advanced

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military technology. Every modern economy and every major

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power’s strategic arsenal, rare earths are the skeleton beneath the skin of

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great power politics. Without them, modern warfare cannot function and

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advanced economies begin to fracture. The world often speaks of power in terms

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of ideology or alliances. But the hard truth is that raw material

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control determines strategic strength. Fighter jets cannot fly without rare

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earth magnets. Missiles cannot guide themselves without specialized materials. Telecommunications,

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satellites, electric vehicles, nuclear

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submarines, and next-generation energy systems, all

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depend on these critical elements. And in this quiet but decisive domain, China

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has achieved what every great power seeks: dominance. Rare earths are not

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geologically scarce. They exist in significant quantities across the world,

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including in the United States, Australia, and parts of Africa. What

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makes China’s position decisive is not the dirt itself, but its control over

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the processing and refining of these elements. This is the critical choke

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point in the global supply chain. Today, Beijing controls roughly 80% of rare

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earth processing capacity. That means even if another country digs the

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material out of the ground, in most cases, it must still go through China to

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be turned into something usable. This control did not emerge by accident. It

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was the result of a deliberate long-term strategic policy in the 1990s and early

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2000s. While Washington was focused on liberalizing trade and pursuing wars of

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choice in the Middle East, Beijing quietly built the infrastructure of

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material power. It subsidized mining, undercut competitors,

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acquired global deposits, and developed statebacked industrial

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chains that now shape the flow of critical minerals worldwide. In essence,

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while the United States was acting like a hegemon, China was building the

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foundations of one for a realist. This is not surprising. States rise by

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controlling the sinews of power. China understood that if it could control the

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inputs of modern technology, it could shape the strategic choices of

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its rivals without firing a single shot. This is how power works in an age of

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interconnected economies, through leverage not just force. A state that controls

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critical choke points can shape behavior. It can deter, coerce, and impose

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costs. In this sense, rare earths are not just economic commodities. They are

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instruments of geopolitical influence. America meanwhile faces a growing dependence on

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its primary strategic competitor. It is a remarkable reversal of roles. During

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the Cold War, the United States dominated global energy flows. Today, it

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must worry about the flow of critical minerals passing through Chinese hands.

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That dependency is not a minor vulnerability. It is a structural one.

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And in international politics, structural vulnerabilities always

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translate into strategic costs. The world’s new power struggle is not just

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playing out in the South China Sea or in diplomatic summits. It is unfolding in

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mines, processing plants, and supply chains, that

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run through Beijing. China is building its power not only through military

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expansion but through material control, constructing a world order where the

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United States is no longer the indispensable nation but the dependent

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one. Power does not accumulate by accident. It is built through deliberate,

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patient, and often invisible, strategy. China’s dominance over the global rare

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earth’s industry is a textbook example of how a rising great power can

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construct structural leverage over its rivals without ever firing a shot. In

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the 1990s, while Washington was celebrating the supposed permanence of liberal hegemony,

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Beijing was quietly laying the groundwork for material dominance. It

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began with a simple calculation in the technological age. Control over inputs

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is control over power itself. China’s rise in rare earths began not with

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military ambition but with industrial policy. Beijing recognized that the rare

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earth market was vulnerable to consolidation because the refining and processing infrastructure was expensive,

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environmentally hazardous, and politically unappealing to many

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Western democracies. [They’re actually ‘democracies’.] The United States once led in this field, but it abandoned

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much of its capacity in the 1990s. Convinced that globalized markets would

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guarantee a cheap supply, that was the critical miscalculation, China stepped into the vacuum with state

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subsidies, price manipulation, and strategic acquisitions. By

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undercutting global competitors on price, Beijing forced mining and

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processing operations in other countries to shut down. At the same time, it

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restricted foreign investment in its own mining sector, ensuring domestic control

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over key production. In a span of two decades, China moved from a marginal

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player to the dominant force in the rare earth supply chain. Uh it not only

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extracted the minerals but also built the entire refining and processing ecosystem around them. In other words,

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it didn’t just dig, it built the machine. Washington, meanwhile, was distracted. It assumed

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that markets, not states, would determine outcomes.

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But international politics is not a classroom for free market theories. It

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is a contest of power. Beijing understood that by absorbing short-term

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costs, it could achieve long-term strategic dominance. This is what great

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powers do. They play the long game. By the early 2010 seconds, China controlled

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roughly 90% of global rare earth processing. Competitors

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um especially in the United States were left with geological reserves but

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without the capacity to convert them into strategic assets. China’s strategy

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also extended beyond its borders. It invested in overseas mining operations,

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particularly in Africa and parts of Southeast Asia, locking in supply streams that would ensure future control

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even if demand skyrocketed. This was not just about profit. It was

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about shaping the global balance of dependence. Nations that rely on Beijing

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for critical inputs find it harder to defy Beijing’s strategic imperative.

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Leverage in resource politics is never just economic. It is political capital.

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The United States, by contrast, treated rare earths as a secondary issue. It

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relied on private industry rather than national strategy,

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outsourcing critical supply chains to global markets that were in fact being

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shaped by a rival state. By the time Washington realized the scale of the

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problem, China’s grip had become embedded in the structure of global

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industry. There is no quick fix for this. Supply chains cannot be rebuilt

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overnight. Once a great power gains control of a choke point, reversing that

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control requires a generational effort. In the realist view, this was a

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predictable outcome. China identified a strategic vulnerability in the global

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system and exploited it with discipline. America, intoxicated

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by its unipolar moment, assumed such vulnerabilities did not exist. Now, as

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geopolitical rivalry intensifies, that assumption is being shattered.

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Beijing built a rare earth empire in silence. Washington only noticed once

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the trap had already closed. And in geopolitics, the state that builds the foundations of

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power quietly usually holds the advantage when the storm arrives. Every

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great power faces moments when its strategic attention drifts from the

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foundations of its strength. For the United States, the postcold war era was

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one such moment. Flush with unipolar dominance,

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Washington believed it could define the international order indefinitely. It

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spent its energy projecting power militarily,

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policing distant conflicts and promoting liberal ‘democracy’ abroad. What it failed

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to do was protect its own material base. This was the blind spot, a belief that

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the physical infrastructure of power would take care of itself. China quietly

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proved that assumption wrong. In the 1980s, the United States still possessed strong

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domestic mining and processing capacity for rare earths. But in the 1990s and

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2000, policymakers embraced a doctrine that treated critical materials as

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ordinary commodities. The liberal economic model held that supply chains

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were global, markets were efficient, and strategic scarcity was a relic of the

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past. Rare earths were cheap and unthreatening. That complacency was

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fatal. The decision to allow the domestic industry to wither was not a

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single act. It was a slow erosion of strategic foresight over decades. While

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China invested heavily in processing capacity, the United States deregulated

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and outsourced. It permitted environmental and economic pressures to push companies out of the sector.

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Washington assumed it could always buy whatever it needed from the global market. A global market that, as it

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turned out, was already being captured by Beijing. No great power should ever

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allow a rival to control the inputs of its military power. But that is exactly

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what happened. The Pentagon’s most advanced systems now depend on supply

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chains that ultimately trace back to Chinese facilities. This is more than an

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economic vulnerability. It is a structural weakness in America’s

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national security architecture. Rare earths are essential for everything from

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precision guided missiles to aircraft engines, from radars to nuclear

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submarines, from surveillance systems to advanced communications. It is difficult to

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overstate how much of US military superiority relies on uninterrupted

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access to these materials. And yet for decades

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the strategic community treated rare earth dependence as a marginal issue, a

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technical matter to be left to the market. Strategic blindness is often

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born of hubris. The United States believed its dominance was unassalable.

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It underestimated Beijing’s capacity to play the long game. Washington’s

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strategic culture focused on immediate crisis, terrorism,

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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the management of alliances, while China

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focused on the material structure of global power. By the time the US defense

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establishment began to acknowledge the problem, China had already built the

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industrial and geopolitical ecosystem around rare earths. The consequences of

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this blind spot are profound. If geopolitical tensions escalate, whether

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over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or global trade, Beijing holds an implicit

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veto over critical segments of the US defense industry. It does not need to

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fire missiles to weaken American power. It can squeeze supply chains,

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delay shipments, or impose export restrictions as it has done before in

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smaller disputes with Japan and others in a high intensity crisis.

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Such leverage would give China a strategic advantage before the first shot is fired. America’s problem is not

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that it lacks resources. It is that it lacks the infrastructure and strategic

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planning to exploit them. It is a self-inflicted vulnerability.

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…

MY COMMENTS: This is the most brilliant analysis of the situation that I have ever encountered. One of the viewer-comments to it noted that Mearsheimer “has been advocating for the containment of China in many of his talks and speeches not realizing the strategic hand China held, and now, like many others, finding out the strength of China.” In the past, I have often criticized Mearsheimer’s analyses as being too much fence-riding in order to not offend his colleagues (consequently not fully realistic); but, this time, in the first 16 minutes of this 39-minute talk (the rest of which was mainly repetitive of this opening), it was flawlessly argued, really a classic analysis, in my opinion (and, I believe, it’s probably 100% realistic).

On 4 March 2024, I headlined “Statistical Comparisons U.S. v. Russia (etc.)” and documented that whereas in GDP terms China had multiplied its economy by 17.44 times during 1998-2022 (inclusive), it had multiplied it in the far more realistic GDP PPP terms by 9.98 times; and America in both calculations had multiplied its economy by 2.81 times, which was below the global average of 3.18 on GDP and of 3.77 on GDP PPP; so, China had been knocking the socks off of America — and even of the entire world — BOTH ways, during those 25 years. Russia’s economic growh during the same period was also outstanding but not as spectaculary as was China’s; and the worst performers of all were Japan and the EU — America’s biggest colonies (indicating that America is exploiting its colonies, which is normal for any imperial country to do to its colonies).

On 29 August 2022, I headlined “Why RussChina Will Probably Be the Dominant Nation Beyond the Year 2100” and documented that China’s “Governmental system has increased (added to) the effectiveness of that population, so as to make China already the world’s #1 nation regarding human resources. Russia is an adjoining nation which has, by far, the world’s largest landmass” and natural resoiurces”; so that the two adjoining countries would probably join together into one to facilitate their synergies, their working together.

On 19 My 2024, I headlined “China & Russia (ChinUssia or RussChina) Announce Their Foreign Policy”. So, ChinUssia or RussChina seems to be coming.

I view the BRICS organization as ultimately growing to replace today’s U.N. by adopting a Charter or Constitution in the FDR mold, ultimately to become the democratic federal World Government ruling over and enforcing ONLY international relations (NO intra-national matters) in the way that I described in my 16 March 2022 “The Transformative Present Moment in History”. This replacement of Truman’s U.N. would end the neoconservatives’ dream, the public’s nightmare, of an ultimate all-encompassing U.S. global empire, a dictatorial World Government, instead of any democratic World Government (such as FDR envisioned).

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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.