19 July 2025, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)
The former leader of the fundamentalist-Sunni ISIS and al-Qaeda forces in Syria, al-Jolani (renamed al-Sharaa) has now suffered his first military defeat at the hands of the fundamentalist-Jewish Israeli Government, which is determined to keep parts of Syria and will now be free to take more of it. This defeat is a shattering blow to al-Sharaa’s followers, whom he increasingly struggles to hold together, while the country that he (backed by support from the U.S., Turkey, Qatar, the Saud family, and Israel) conquered from the fleeing prior secularist (anti-sectarian) Syrian Government by Bashar al-Assad, whom the U.S. regime had been planning ever since 2009 to overthrow, and actively started in 2011 to overthrow (that’s also archived here).
On July 17th, SouthFront headlined “NEW SYRIA SUFFERS FIRST DEFEAT” (archived here), and reported:
Syria’s new Islamist-led government has suffered its first defeat in al-Suwayda, where [Christian] Druze fighters backed by Israel solidified their control over the southern governorate.
The battle in al-Suwayda broke out on July 13 with a confrontation between Druze fighters and Sunni tribesmen. The clashes, which were focused in the eastern outskirts of al-Suwayda city, were the result of a series of assaults on Druze civilians traveling on the highway that linked the governorate with the capital, Damascus.
Early on July 14, the [al-Sharaa] government announced that it was sending its military and security forces to al-Suwayda to end the confrontation. However, [the Sunni] government forces sided with the [Sunni] tribesmen and launched a major offensive [against the Druze Christians] on al-Suwayda city.
Israel, which had vowed to protect Syrian Druze after the fall of the Assad regime last December, intervened, launching a few strikes at government forces.
On July 15, government forces stormed al-Suwayda city. Reports of war crimes, including summary executions of Druze civilians, began to surface.
Despite being overpowered, Druze fighters, led by the al-Suwayda Military Council, showed fierce resistance. Later on the same day, with direct Israeli air support, the fighters launched a counter-attack and managed to recapture most of the city.
All of the progress was lost, however, by early July 16, with government forces, reinforced with heavy weapons and drones, re-entering al-Suwayda.
What came next was an unprecedented escalation by Israel against Syria’s new rulers. Multiple Israeli strikes hit the Syrian military headquarters as well as the Presidential Palace in Damascus, with [Israel’s] Defense Minister Israel Katz declaring that “the signaling in Damascus is over, now come the painful blows.”
Other Israeli strikes hit government convoys near Damascus, military sites in the southern governorate of Daraa, as well as the forces operating in al-Suwayda and its outskirts. The strikes in Daraa claimed the lives of four senior commanders, in the first instance of Israel deliberately killing officials of the new government.
Late at night, the Syrian government announced an agreement with Druze leaders to end fighting, withdrew the military and deploye security forces in the city. However, the agreement was rejected by the spiritual leader of the group, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri.
Early on July 17, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa conceded the defeat, announcing a full withdrawal from al-Suwayda. Up to 700 government troops were reportedly killed. The losses on the other side are still unclear, but at least dozens of Druze civilians were reportedly executed.
The defeat in al-Suwayda was the first serious blow to the Syrian government. Despite engaging in talks with Sharaa, Israel appears to have its own agenda for Syria, which likely includes dividing the country.
On July 16th, Syria Observer headlined “From Spiritual Guide to Political Actor: Who Is Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri?” (archived here) and reported:
As the southern Syrian province of Suweida grapples with crisis and upheaval, one name looms large over the headlines: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Once confined to his role as a spiritual authority among Syria’s Druze community, Hijri has, over the past decade, evolved into one of the most polarizing political actors in the country’s post-Assad landscape.
His rise is emblematic of a broader shift in Syria, where local and sectarian leaders — often sidelined or co-opted under Baathist authoritarianism — have reasserted themselves, amid the state’s collapse and the contested reconstruction of authority.
A Complicated Inheritance
Hijri inherited the title of Sheikh al-‘Aql, or chief Druze religious leader, under unusual circumstances following the death of his brother in a car accident. Though initially perceived as a reluctant heir to the position, close associates suggest he had long harboured ambitions to revive the influence of the role — once a prestigious post with both spiritual and political clout — beyond the ceremonial status it had been reduced to under Baathist rule.
His lineage only strengthened this aspiration. He descends from a revered line of Druze religious leaders. His ancestor, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hijri, became a semi-mythical figure among the Druze for leading resistance against Egyptian ruler Ibrahim Pasha in the 19th century. Later, Sheikh Ahmad al-Hijri, who died in 1953, emerged as a national figure during the French Mandate and early independence, hosting Syrian nationalist leaders in his home.
However, by the time Sheikh Hikmat assumed the position, the Syrian state under Hafez and then Bashar al-Assad had significantly diminished the autonomy of traditional religious and tribal leadership. Religious figures — including Druze clerics — were expected to conform to the role of mashāyikh al-sultān (“clergy of the regime”), often receiving government cars and stipends in exchange for political loyalty.
Hijri initially conformed to this mold, but according to those close to him, he did so begrudgingly, hiding a long-standing desire to break with this dependency and restore the role’s former significance.
From Symbol to Separatist?
The 2011 uprising — and especially the unrest in Suweida — provided al-Hijri an opening. By the final years of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, al-Hijri had aligned himself with popular opposition movements in the province, notably the Karama Square protests, where he gained a following as a spiritual figure advocating for civil resistance.
After Assad’s fall in late 2024, Hijri’s home became a political pilgrimage site, receiving delegations from across Syria. Some began likening him to Sultan al-Atrash, the legendary Druze leader of the 1925 Syrian Revolt against the French. But what appeared as a return to nationalist heroism soon veered in a very different direction.
Critics argue that Hijri’s increasingly political tone — calling for a new constitution, secular democracy, and inclusive dialogue — began to sound less like civic demands and more like sectarian bargaining. Speaking on behalf of “the Druze” as a bloc, he inadvertently positioned his community in direct confrontation with the Sunni majority, they argue. His demands, while at times justified, came to be viewed through a communal lens rather than as universal principles.
Worse still, say his detractors, was his shift from spiritual guide to would-be regional actor. Hijri began to engage with foreign powers and speak of the Druze as a distinct regional force. His circle maintained informal communications with U.S. contacts — allegedly through his relative, Khaldoun al-Hijri, based in the United States — as well as less publicized exchanges with Druze leadership in Israel.
The Shadow of Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif
One of the most controversial dimensions of Hijri’s role is his alleged relationship with Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the Druze spiritual leader in Israel. Though the two have never publicly acknowledged contact, numerous activists in Suweida describe their connection as an “open secret.” Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt hinted as much in a recent interview, suggesting that al-Hijri is “influenced” by Tarif — a statement seen by many as a diplomatic understatement.
Members of Hijri’s inner circle reportedly consult Tarif’s “advice” on political positioning, especially regarding international actors. Analysts speculate that Tarif encouraged Hijri to capitalize on Israeli, American, and European pressure on Damascus to extract local gains for Suweida—an idea many see as reckless and destabilizing. Such manoeuvres, they warn, risked rupturing the fragile social fabric of Syria even further.
Indeed, the Syrian government has been accused of playing both sides of this dynamic: turning a blind eye to Israeli messaging toward the Druze at first, only to later use those same messages to rally public opinion against Hijri and justify military actions. At the same time, pro-government factions reportedly carried out sectarian attacks in Druze areas near Damascus, lending credence to Hijri’s suspicions and reinforcing his base.
Still, some believe the tide may be turning. Both the U.S. and Israel appear to have distanced themselves from Hijri’s escalating rhetoric in recent weeks. Sheikh Tarif, too, is said to have backed away from the Syrian cleric. These developments raise a critical question: on what basis did Hijri continue to escalate his confrontation with the new Syrian government?
What Comes Next?
With the Syrian Ministry of Interior now in control of Suweida following the recent Israeli strikes and internal security deployment, Hijri’s future hangs in the balance. Some sources suggest that a behind-the-scenes deal — possibly brokered by Walid Jumblatt — is in the works, though details remain murky.
For now, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri stands at a crossroads: once a revered spiritual leader, then a national symbol of civil resistance [against the prior, secularist, Government], and now a polarizing figure whose political ambitions may have overstepped both his mandate and his moment. Whether history remembers him as a visionary or a divisive opportunist will depend on how the days ahead unfold — and on how far Syria is willing to go to reconcile its fractured identities.
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On Friday night, July 18th, Reuters headlined “Israel and Syria agree ceasefire as Israel allows Syrian troops limited access to Sweida”, and reported that the Trump Administration had gotten al-Sharaa’s consent to temporarily halt attacks against the Druze. “Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has worked to establish warmer ties with the U.S., accused Israel of trying to fracture Syria and promised to protect its Druze minority.” Trump is siding with Israel, against Sharaa. Sharaa is obeying. Whether he will be able to hold his fighters together this way is unknown. But the initial signs are that he won’t. The best up-to-date news-site on wars is South Front, and on July 19th it headlined “TRIBAL FIGHTERS STORM AL-SUWAYDA CITY AMID REPORTS OF MASS ATROCITIES (18+ VIDEOS)”. Syria is clearly repeating Libya, which repeated Iraq, which repeated Afghanistan; but U.S. armaments-makers profit enormously from each of these — and each of the other U.S.-generated — wars. It’s a terrific business to invest in, and America’s billionaires know this.
MY COMMENTARY: What Obama did to Libya, he and his successors Biden and Trump together, did also to Syria. Throughout that long period, overwhelming majorities in both the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate, and in both of America’s (fascist-imperialist) political Parties, and their respective propaganda agencies (such as their ‘news’-media) likewise supported both operations (including unlimited U.S. armaments to Israel for its bombings of Syria and for the genocide against Gazans). The U.S. regime’s colonies (‘allies’) likewise did (and Germany contributed 30% of those armaments to Israel). For more information about the U.S. regime’s rape of Syria, I recommend Stephen Gowans’s excellent 2017 book Washington's Long War on Syria. It is systematic, and it individually names key operatives. Its only lacks are its non-coverage of the CIA cut-out operations by some of the ‘non-profits’ (‘NGOs’) such as NED (National Endowment for Democracy), USAID and Soros’s Open Society Foundation, in fomenting the 2011 demonstrations to overthroow Assad. For example, according to NED’s 2011 Annual Report (p.70 of the pdf), NED spent over $600,000 that year in Syria, $500,000 of which came from the U.S. Republican Party’s International Republican Institute. Nowadays, such ‘non-profits’ do much of the work that formerly only the CIA did. The coup-producing machinery is at least as effective now as it was when it first was set up in 1947 to take over the world.
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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.