The $10 Trillion-Plus Costs of Trump’s Imperialism
25 November 2025, posted by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)
The economic genius Yanis Varoufakis tallies it all up in this extraordinary 27-minute talk:
——
“Russia’s Missiles Target U.S. Navy — Venezuela’s Deadly Warning to Washington | Yanis Varoufakis”
25 November 2025, The Sharpline
Transcript [unedited]
0:00
What we’re witnessing right now in the
0:01
Caribbean isn’t just another regional
0:03
conflict. This is a fundamental
0:05
restructuring of global economic power
0:08
that will have cascading effects across
0:10
energy markets, currency systems, and
0:12
trade relationships for decades to come.
0:15
And frankly, most analysts are missing
0:17
the bigger picture entirely. Uh let me
0:20
start with what’s actually happening on
0:21
the ground because the military
0:23
movements tell us everything we need to
0:25
know about the economic stakes involved.
0:28
The United States has deployed over
0:31
12,000 troops on nearly a dozen naval
0:34
vessels uh to Venezuelan waters. The USS
0:38
Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest
0:40
aircraft carrier, arrived in the
0:42
Caribbean Sea on November 15th.
0:46
This isn’t a show of force. This is a
0:48
blockade in everything but name. And
0:50
blockades have one purpose, economic
0:52
strangulation. Now, why does this
0:54
matter? Venezuela sits on the largest
0:57
proven oil reserves in the world. We’re
1:00
talking about 303.8 billion barrels.
1:03
That’s more than Saudi Arabia, more than
1:05
Canada, more than Russia. And for
1:08
context, that represents roughly 18% of
1:11
global proven reserves. But here’s where
1:13
it gets interesting. Uh, from an
1:15
economic standpoint, uh, Venezuela’s,
1:18
uh, oil production has collapsed from
1:22
3.5 million barrels per day in the late
1:24
1990s to barely 700,000 barrels per day
1:28
today. That’s an 80% decline in
1:30
production capacity. The Trump
1:32
administration just terminated
1:35
Chevron’s permit to export Venezuelan
1:40
oil on November 24th, 2025. Uh this was
1:44
the last remaining legal channel for
1:46
Venezuelan crude to reach international
1:49
markets. Chevron had been the lifeline
1:52
keeping what remained of Venezuela’s oil
1:55
infrastructure operational. Without
1:58
their technical expertise and capital
2:00
investment, we’re looking at uh further
2:03
production declines of potentially 30 to
2:05
40% within the next 12 months. But Trump
2:08
didn’t stop there. He imposed a 25%
2:11
tariff on all goods imported from any
2:14
country that imports Venezuelan oil.
2:17
Think about the implications of that for
2:18
a moment. This isn’t just sanctioning
2:20
Venezuela. This is sanctioning anyone
2:23
who does business with Venezuela. India
2:25
and China have been the primary buyers
2:27
of Venezuelan crude in recent years,
2:30
taking advantage of steep discounts.
2:32
India was importing roughly 200,000
2:36
barrels per day of Venezuelan oil. China
2:38
was taking even more around 400,000
2:42
barrels daily. Now, here’s where the
2:44
economic domino start falling. India
2:47
relies on imported oil for 85% of its
2:50
consumption. Chinese demand for oil sits
2:54
at roughly 15 million barrels per day
2:56
with domestic production covering only
2:58
about 4 million. Both economies are
3:00
heavily dependent on affordable energy
3:02
imports to maintain their um
3:05
manufacturing competitiveness. If they
3:08
comply with American pressure and stop
3:09
buying Venezuelan oil, they need to find
3:12
alternative suppliers. That means
3:14
bidding up prices in an already tight
3:17
global oil market. If they don’t comply
3:19
and continue purchasing Venezuelan
3:21
crude, they face a 25% tariff on all
3:26
exports to the United States. For India,
3:29
the US represents roughly 18% of total
3:33
exports worth over 78 billion annually.
3:37
For China, we are talking about 16% of
3:42
exports
3:43
valued at more than $500 billion.
3:47
The economic calculus here is brutal.
3:49
either accept higher energy costs that
3:53
reduce manufacturing competitiveness or
3:56
accept massive tariffs that price you
3:58
out of the American market. This is
4:01
economic warfare at a scale we haven’t
4:03
seen since the 1970s
4:07
oil embargo and it’s happening right
4:09
now. Let’s talk about uh what this means
4:12
for global oil prices. Brent crude is
4:15
currently trading around $87 per barrel.
4:18
West Texas Intermediate is at 83. These
4:21
prices reflect a market that’s already
4:24
relatively tight. Global spare capacity,
4:27
the amount of oil that can be brought
4:28
online within 30 days and sustained for
4:31
90 days, currently sits at around 3
4:33
million barrels per day. That’s roughly
4:36
3% of global demand. Historically, when
4:39
spare capacity falls below 5%, we see
4:42
significant price volatility. If uh
4:45
Venezuelan production drops another
4:47
300,000 barrels per day due to the loss
4:50
of Chevron’s technical support and
4:53
expertise and uh if India and China are
4:58
forced to compete for alternative
5:00
supplies, we could easily see oil prices
5:04
spike to $120 to $140 per barrel within
5:09
6 to9 months. Every $10 increase in oil
5:12
prices reduces global GDP growth by
5:16
approximately 0.2 percentage points. A
5:19
sustained move to $130 oil would shave
5:22
nearly one full percentage point off
5:25
global growth. For the United States
5:27
specifically, higher oil prices act as a
5:30
massive regressive tax on consumers.
5:33
Every 1 cent increase in gasoline prices
5:37
represents roughly $1.4 4 billion in
5:40
additional annual consumer spending on
5:42
fuel. If we’re looking at crude oil
5:44
moving from $80 to $130 per barrel, uh
5:49
retail gasoline prices could jump from
5:53
the current national average of $3.30
5:55
per gallon to somewhere north of $5 per
5:58
gallon. That’s an additional 250 to300
6:02
billion dollars coming out of American
6:06
consumer spending on gasoline alone. But
6:10
energy prices are just the beginning.
6:13
Let’s examine what happens when you
6:16
deploy 12,000 troops and a carrier
6:18
strike group indefinitely to the
6:20
Caribbean. The operational cost of
6:23
running a carrier strike group is
6:24
roughly $6.5 million per day. That’s
6:29
$2.4 billion per year just for the Ford
6:32
Strike Group. But we’re not talking
6:34
about one carrier. The US has deployed
6:37
nearly a dozen naval vessels to the
6:39
region. The total cost of this military
6:42
deployment is likely running between 8
6:45
and $10 million per day or roughly $3
6:47
billion annually if sustained. Now,
6:50
let’s talk about the elephant in the
6:52
room, Russia. On October 27th,
6:56
2025, Putin ratified a strategic
6:59
partnership treaty with Venezuela. This
7:02
isn’t just diplomatic posturing. Russian
7:04
lawmakers have stated explicitly that
7:06
there are no obstacles to providing
7:08
ornik or caliber missiles to Venezuela.
7:12
The Orreshnik intermediate range
7:15
ballistic missile has a reported maximum
7:17
range of about 3,400 mi. That’s enough
7:20
to reach most of the continental United
7:22
States from Venezuelan territory. Why
7:24
would Russia take this risk? Because
7:27
Venezuela represents a strategic
7:29
economic asset in Russia’s broader
7:32
confrontation with the West. Uh Russian
7:34
oil exports have already been heavily
7:36
sanctioned since the invasion of
7:37
Ukraine. Euros crude the Russian
7:40
benchmark has been trading at
7:42
significant discounts to brand typically
7:45
$15 to $20 per barrel below
7:47
international prices. Russia has been
7:49
forced to redirect its oil exports
7:51
almost entirely to Asia, particularly
7:54
India and China. If the United States
7:56
successfully chokes off Venezuelan oil
8:00
supplies and forces India and China to
8:02
find alternatives,
8:04
Russia becomes one of the most logical
8:06
suppliers to fill that gap. Despite
8:08
sanctions, Russian oil production has
8:11
remained relatively stable at around 9.5
8:14
million barrels per day. They have the
8:16
capacity to increase exports if there’s
8:19
demand. By supporting Venezuela
8:22
militarily, uh, Russia accomplishes
8:25
multiple objectives simultaneously.
8:28
First, it ties down American military
8:32
resources in the Western Hemisphere.
8:35
Second, it creates leverage in ongoing
8:39
negotiations over Ukraine. Third, it
8:42
positions Russia as a critical energy
8:44
supplier to the world’s largest growth
8:47
markets. Think about this from China’s
8:49
perspective. China imported um roughly
8:52
11 million barrels per day of crude oil
8:55
in 2024. They’ve been diversifying away
8:58
from uh Middle Eastern suppliers for
9:01
years, increasing purchases from Russia,
9:03
Venezuela, Iran, and other sanctioned
9:06
producers. Why? Because sanctioned oil
9:09
comes with steep discounts. Venezuelan
9:12
crude has been selling for $30 to $40
9:16
per barrel below brand prices. That’s uh
9:19
uh a savings of roughly $150 million per
9:23
day for China on the 400,000 barrels
9:26
they’ve been importing from Venezuela.
9:29
But there’s a deeper strategic
9:30
consideration. China holds over $800
9:34
billion in US Treasury securities. If
9:37
the United States imposes a 25% tariff
9:40
on all Chinese goods because China
9:41
continues buying Venezuelan oil, what’s
9:43
China’s response? They could dump
9:46
treasuries driving up US borrowing
9:49
costs. They could devalue uh the yuan uh
9:53
making their exports more competitive
9:55
despite tariffs. They could accelerate
9:58
the internationalization of the yuan as
10:00
an alternative to dollarbased trade.
10:03
This last point is crucial. For decades,
10:06
oil has been priced and traded primarily
10:09
in US dollars. This gives the United
10:12
States enormous structural power in the
10:14
global economy. Countries need dollars
10:18
to buy oil, which means they need to
10:20
hold dollar reserves, which means they
10:24
buy US Treasury securities, which allows
10:27
the US to run massive deficits without
10:31
facing the same constraints other
10:32
countries would face. But what happens
10:34
when sanctioned producers like Russia,
10:39
Venezuela, and Iran start accepting yuan
10:43
for oil? China has been pushing for
10:46
exactly this arrangement for years.
10:48
Russia has already shifted significant
10:51
portions of its trade with China to yuan
10:54
settlement. If Venezuelan oil starts
10:57
trading in yuan and if Indian purchases
11:01
from Russia expand in rupee ruble
11:03
arrangements, we are looking at the
11:05
beginning of a genuine alternative to
11:07
the petro dollar system. The economic
11:09
implications are staggering. The dollar
11:13
currently represents roughly 59% of
11:17
global foreign exchange reserves. If
11:20
that share drops to 50% over the next
11:22
decade, it means central banks worldwide
11:25
are holding $600 billion less in US
11:28
assets. That’s $600 billion of demand
11:32
for treasuries that evaporates. In a
11:35
market where the US needs to borrow
11:37
nearly $2 trillion annually just to
11:39
cover the deficit, losing even 10% of
11:42
foreign demand would push interest rates
11:45
significantly higher. Let’s run through
11:47
a scenario. Current 10-year Treasury
11:49
yields are around 4.4%. If foreign
11:53
demand for treasuries drops by 10 to 15%
11:56
due to dillization pressures, yields
11:59
could rise to 5.5 or 6%. Every 1
12:03
percentage point increase in the 10-year
12:06
yield adds roughly $400 billion to
12:11
federal interest costs over a decade.
12:14
We’re talking about an additional cost
12:16
of 500 to600 billion in debt servicing
12:20
and that’s before we consider domestic
12:23
economic impacts. Higher treasury yields
12:27
mean higher mortgage rates, higher
12:30
corporate borrowing costs, higher state
12:32
and local government financing costs.
12:35
The 30-year fixed mortgage rate,
12:37
currently around 7%,
12:40
could push toward 8 to 8.5%.
12:43
that effectively freezes the housing
12:47
market as potential buyers are priced
12:49
out and existing homeowners with 3 to 4%
12:52
mortgages from a few years ago have no
12:54
incentive to sell and trade up to much
12:56
higher rates. Now, let’s circle back to
12:58
Venezuela and uh um the immediate
13:01
crisis. The Trump administration
13:03
designated Maduro and Venezuelan
13:06
government officials as members of uh
13:09
the cartel de los Solis foreign
13:11
terrorist organization on November 24th.
13:14
This is an escalation with profound
13:17
economic consequences. When you
13:19
designate a government as a terrorist
13:20
organization, you criminalize not just
13:23
governmentto relations, but any economic
13:25
activity that might benefit that
13:26
government. That means any company
13:28
anywhere in the world that does business
13:30
with Venezuela could potentially face
13:32
prosecution under US law for material
13:34
support of terrorism. Think about the
13:36
chilling effect on trade. Venezuela
13:40
imported roughly 12 billion worth of
13:43
goods in 2023.
13:45
Uh most of that came from China, Turkey,
13:48
Brazil, um and European suppliers. If
13:54
those companies face potential criminal
13:57
liability for continued trade,
14:00
Venezuela’s import capacity collapses
14:03
even further. Venezuela’s economy has
14:05
already contracted by approximately 75%
14:08
since 2013. GDP fell from $337 billion
14:14
to roughly $97 billion. This is economic
14:18
collapse on a scale rarely seen outside
14:20
of major wars. Hyperinflation peaked at
14:24
over 1 million% in 2019 before
14:27
dollarization brought some stability.
14:29
But with imports collapsing and the oil
14:32
sector facing further decline, we could
14:35
see renewed inflationary spirals. When
14:40
economies collapse this severely, you
14:44
get migration. Venezuela has already
14:46
experienced the largest refugee crisis
14:48
in Western Hemisphere history with over
14:50
7.7 million people fleeing the country
14:52
since 2014. That’s more than one quarter
14:55
of the population.
14:57
If economic conditions deteriorate
14:59
further, we could see another 2 to three
15:02
million people attempting to leave.
15:03
Where do they go? Colombia has already
15:06
absorbed 2.9 million Venezuelan
15:08
refugees. Panama has become a major
15:11
transit route for migrants heading north
15:13
through the Darian Gap.
15:15
Mexico is seeing increased flows and um
15:19
ultimately many are heading to the
15:21
United States. The economic cost of this
15:24
migration is enormous
15:26
uh both for host countries providing
15:28
services and for Venezuela losing its
15:31
most productive population. Let’s talk
15:33
about what uh military conflict would
15:36
actually mean economically. If the
15:38
United States conducts strikes against
15:40
Venezuelan military targets or attempts
15:43
a broader intervention, oil markets
15:46
would go into panic mode immediately. We
15:48
saw this during the Gulf War in 1990 to
15:51
911 when oil prices spiked from $20 to
15:54
$40 per barrel in a matter of weeks. We
15:57
saw it again briefly in uh 2003 with the
16:00
Iraq invasion. A military conflict
16:02
involving Venezuela would be different
16:04
because of Venezuela’s strategic
16:06
location. The Caribbean is a crucial
16:08
transit route for global commerce.
16:11
Approximately 12% of global seaborn oil
16:14
trade passes through the Caribbean.
16:16
15% of US petroleum imports transit
16:20
through the region. If that route
16:21
becomes a conflict zone, insurance rates
16:24
for shipping spike dramatically. We’re
16:27
talking about increases from current
16:31
rates of around 0.1% of cargo value to
16:36
potentially 2 to 3% of cargo value in a
16:39
conflict zone. That might not sound like
16:42
much, but um when you’re shipping
16:45
500,000 barrels of oil worth $43 million
16:49
at current prices, a 2% insurance
16:52
premium adds nearly $900,000 to the
16:57
cost.
16:58
That gets passed directly to consumers.
17:01
Shipping costs from the Gulf of Mexico
17:03
to East Coast refineries could double or
17:06
triple overnight. Venezuela has 21
17:08
operational Suhoy SU30 fighters that can
17:11
be armed with supersonic KH31A
17:14
anti-hship missiles. These missiles have
17:17
a range of about 160 km and are
17:20
specifically designed to target naval
17:22
vessels. Venezuela also reportedly now
17:25
has Russian Pansir1 and Book M2e air
17:28
defense systems. If Russia provides more
17:31
advanced missile systems like the
17:33
caliber cruise missile, which has a
17:35
range of 2,500 km, suddenly every US
17:39
Navy vessel in the Caribbean is
17:41
potentially at risk. The USS Gerald R.
17:44
Ford carries over 4,500
17:48
sailors. A Ford class carrier costs 13.3
17:53
billion to build. Losing even one major
17:56
naval vessel in this conflict would be
17:57
an economic and strategic catastrophe
17:59
beyond measure. The risk premium on such
18:02
an engagement is enormous. Uh which is
18:05
precisely why Venezuela and Russia are
18:07
emphasizing these capabilities. They’re
18:09
trying to make the cost of intervention
18:11
prohibitively high. From a game theory
18:13
perspective,
18:15
both sides are locked in a commitment
18:17
problem. The Trump administration has
18:20
deployed massive military resources and
18:23
issued ultimatums. Backing down now
18:25
would be seen as weakness, potentially
18:28
emboldening rivals elsewhere. But
18:31
Venezuela,
18:32
supported by Russia, has its own
18:35
credibility on the line. If they
18:36
capitulate to US pressure, Maduro’s
18:39
government likely falls and Russia loses
18:43
a strategic foothold in the Western
18:45
Hemisphere. This is where economics and
18:46
strategy become inseparable. The current
18:49
standoff is consuming roughly $10
18:52
million per day in direct military costs
18:55
for the United States. That’s $3.7
18:58
billion annually. Uh but the indirect
19:02
costs, higher oil prices,
19:06
reduced trade, increased migration
19:10
are likely 10 to 20 times higher. We
19:13
could easily be looking at 40 to 70
19:16
billion dollars in total economic impact
19:19
annually if uh this situation continues
19:22
and it will continue because neither
19:24
side can afford to back down without
19:26
achieving their core objectives. The
19:28
United States wants regime change in
19:30
Venezuela or at minimum a complete
19:34
reorientation of Venezuelan foreign
19:36
policy away from Russia and China.
19:38
Venezuela wants survival, sanctions
19:41
relief, and access to international
19:43
markets for its oil. Um, Russia wants to
19:47
maintain its strategic partnership and
19:50
use Venezuela as leverage um in broader
19:53
negotiations over Ukraine and European
19:56
security. China wants stable energy
19:58
supplies at reasonable prices and
20:01
doesn’t particularly care who governs
20:03
Venezuela as long as the oil keeps
20:06
flowing. India finds itself caught in
20:08
the middle trying to balance its growing
20:10
strategic partnership with the United
20:12
States against its desperate need for
20:14
affordable energy to fuel economic
20:17
growth. Let’s examine what the endgame
20:19
scenarios look like economically.
20:21
Scenario one, the United States
20:23
successfully pressures regime change in
20:26
Venezuela through a combination of
20:28
military pressure, economic sanctions,
20:31
and support for opposition forces. A new
20:33
government comes to power, normalizes
20:35
relations with Washington, and begins
20:37
the long process of rebuilding the oil
20:40
sector with American and European
20:42
investment. In this scenario, uh
20:45
Venezuelan oil production could
20:47
potentially recover to 2 to 2.5 million
20:51
barrels per day within 5 to 7 years.
20:54
That additional 1.5 million barrels per
20:57
day would represent a meaningful
21:00
increase in global supply, potentially
21:02
bringing prices down by $10 to $15 per
21:04
barrel in the medium-term. The US gets a
21:07
friendly government in Karakas. Russian
21:09
influence is expelled from the Western
21:11
Hemisphere, and American energy
21:13
companies get access to the world’s
21:15
largest oil reserves. But here’s the
21:18
problem. Rebuilding Venezuela’s oil
21:20
infrastructure would require between 100
21:23
and $200 billion in investment over a
21:27
decade. Given the political risk,
21:30
investors would demand risk premiums of
21:32
10 to 15% returns. At current oil
21:36
prices, that might be achievable. But if
21:40
oil transitions to a structurally lower
21:43
price environment due to increasing
21:46
renewable energy adoption, as many
21:48
predict,
21:50
those investments don’t make economic
21:52
sense. Scenario two, uh, the current
21:55
standoff continues indefinitely,
21:58
becoming a frozen conflict, similar to
22:00
the situation with Cuba for decades.
22:02
sanctions remain in place. Venezuelan
22:05
oil production continues declining, and
22:07
the country becomes increasingly
22:08
dependent on Russia and China for
22:10
economic survival. In this scenario,
22:13
we’re looking at sustained higher oil
22:15
prices, continued migration flows, and
22:18
ongoing military expenditures for the
22:20
United States. The economic drag on the
22:22
US economy would be persistent but
22:24
manageable, perhaps 0.2 to 0.3
22:27
percentage points of GDP growth
22:29
annually. However, the cumulative cost
22:33
over a decade would be substantial,
22:35
potentially 500 billion to 700 billion
22:38
in lost growth. Russia and China
22:40
strengthen their position in Latin
22:41
America, and the trend toward
22:43
dualization accelerates as more
22:45
countries seek to avoid being caught in
22:48
similar sanctions regimes. Scenario
22:50
three, military escalation. The United
22:52
States conducts broader strikes against
22:56
Venezuelan military infrastructure or
22:59
attempts a limited intervention.
23:01
Venezuela with uh Russian support uh
23:05
retaliates against uh US naval vessels
23:08
or regional allies. uh the conflict
23:12
escalates into a broader uh regional war
23:16
involving Colombia, Brazil uh and um
23:20
potentially other actors. Um this is the
23:24
nightmare scenario economically. Oil
23:27
prices spike to 150 to $200 per barrel.
23:32
Global growth contracts by two to three
23:35
percentage points. The US faces
23:37
simultaneous challenges in Europe with
23:40
Ukraine, in the Middle East, and now in
23:43
Latin America, overstretching military
23:45
resources. The federal budget deficit
23:48
explodes to 2.5 to3 trillion annually as
23:52
military spending surges and economic
23:55
growth collapses. Um, realistically, I
23:59
assess scenario two as most likely. Uh
24:03
neither side wants full-scale war, but
24:06
neither can back down without
24:07
unacceptable losses. We’re heading
24:10
toward a protracted economic siege of
24:11
Venezuela with Russia and China
24:13
providing enough support to prevent
24:15
total collapse, but not enough to
24:17
restore prosperity. The Caribbean
24:18
becomes another zone of great power
24:21
competition with all the associated
24:23
costs and risks. For global markets,
24:26
this means several things. First, oil
24:29
volatility is here to stay. Any
24:31
resolution of this crisis is years away,
24:34
which means the risk premium on oil
24:36
prices remains elevated. Energy
24:39
intensive industries need to plan for
24:41
sustained higher costs. Second, the
24:44
ddollarization trend accelerates.
24:47
More countries will seek alternatives to
24:49
dollar-based trade to reduce
24:50
vulnerability to US sanctions. Third,
24:54
defense spending globally increases as
24:57
countries observe that economic
24:59
interdependence didn’t prevent great
25:01
power competition. It just changed the
25:04
battlefield. The broader lesson here is
25:07
that uh we’ve entered an era where
25:11
economic policy and military strategy
25:14
are completely fused. Sanctions are
25:17
weapons. Trade policies are tactics.
25:21
Currency systems are strategic assets.
25:24
The postcold war assumption that
25:26
economic integration would reduce
25:28
conflict has been proven wrong. Instead,
25:30
economic integration created
25:32
vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
25:35
And we are watching that exploitation
25:37
happen in real time off the coast of
25:40
Venezuela. For investors, this
25:42
environment demands a fundamental
25:44
reassessment of risk. Geographic
25:46
diversification isn’t enough. When
25:49
conflicts can disrupt global supply
25:51
chains, currency diversification becomes
25:53
essential when the dollar’s role is
25:55
being challenged. Energy security
25:57
transitions from a nice to have to a
25:59
critical requirement for any major
26:01
economy. The Venezuela crisis is a
26:03
preview of the conflicts to come. As
26:05
climate change disrupts agriculture, as
26:08
water resources becomes scarce, as
26:11
critical minerals for technology become
26:13
strategic assets, we’ll see more
26:15
situations where economic interests and
26:19
military power intersect. The cost of
26:22
these conflicts measured in reduced
26:25
growth, higher defense spending, and
26:28
lost opportunities for cooperation will
26:31
be measured in the trillions. What we
26:33
are witnessing isn’t just about
26:34
Venezuela. It’s about the rules of the
26:36
global economic system being rewritten
26:39
through confrontation rather than
26:41
negotiation. And that process regardless
26:44
of how it resolves in this particular
26:46
case will define the economic landscape
26:49
for decades to come.
—————
Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.
One thing missing from this in relation to oil is the potential for Iran to choke oil supplies from Arabia if they see a chance to assist Venezuela and the immediate impact of that on oil prices.