Why the Trump Administration Must Be Replaced Immediately

7 August 2026, by Eric Zuesse. (All of my recent articles can be seen here.)

They are heading the world straight into a global nuclear war and lying in order to do it.

On August 5th, NBC News (paywalled), and Britain’s Telegraph newspaper, reported the Trump Administration’s plan for the U.S. to be the first nation to use atomic bombs since the U.S. did it on August 6th and 9th in 1945 to end WW2. Here is the opening of the Telegraph’s report:

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https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2026/08/05/pentagon-nuclear-weapons-strategy-war-russia-china/

https://archive.is/96Fev

“Pentagon draws up new nuclear weapons strategy for war with Russia and China. Policy shift to prioritise shorter-range tactical equipment set to expand Trump’s options during conflict.”

W. 5 August 2026

The Pentagon is drafting a new nuclear weapons strategy to prepare for a potential conflict with China or Russia, marking a significant shift in US military tactics.

The strategy, overseen by Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s policy chief, would place greater emphasis on shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a regional war, rather than relying on long-range strategic missiles.

Mr Colby is expected to discuss the plans on Wednesday during a private military event in Nebraska while visiting the US Strategic Command, which oversees nuclear forces, NBC reported.

According to sources familiar with the plans, the strategy is designed to address scenarios in which US allies come under attack from Russia or China in a regional conflict.

A senior US defence department official told NBC: “Our view is that we need credible nuclear options.”

The strategy would not restrict Donald Trump’s choices but instead “expand the president’s option space by providing him with realistic and credible options and therefore strengthen deterrence”, the official said.

The new strategy would increase Donald Trump’s nuclear options during crises, said an official Credit: Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters

Mr Colby has long argued in favour of tactical nuclear weapons, which are smaller, shorter-range warheads designed for battlefield use or against specific military targets rather than entire cities.

He has also argued that the US existing nuclear doctrine lacks credibility because it relies heavily on the threat of launching long-range strategic weapons capable of destroying an adversary’s entire nuclear force.

I asked ChatGPT “Is it true to say of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons that they can be much larger and kill more people than the Hiroshima bomb but are called ‘tactical’ because the nation using it prefers to call it that?” Here was the exchange I had with that AI (which is the best currently available one for the general public):

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Yes—with an important qualification.

It is true that a nuclear weapon classified as “tactical” can have a yield substantially greater than the Hiroshima bomb. Hiroshima’s Little Boy had an estimated yield of about 15 kilotons. Some weapons historically classified as tactical/non-strategic have had yields of tens or even hundreds of kilotons. Consequently, under comparable circumstances, a so-called tactical weapon could cause much greater destruction and potentially kill many more people than the Hiroshima bomb.

But I would modify the second part of your statement. “Tactical” does not simply mean “whatever the nation using it prefers to call tactical.” Traditionally, the distinction concerns principally the weapon’s intended military role, target, delivery system, and theater of employment, rather than its explosive yield.

A useful formulation would be:

A “tactical” nuclear weapon can be much more powerful and kill many more people than the Hiroshima bomb. It is called tactical not because its destructive effects are necessarily limited, but because it is classified as intended for battlefield or theater military use rather than for strategic attack on an adversary’s homeland or fundamental war-making capacity.

There is nevertheless an important element of what you are suggesting: the categories are human military classifications, not physical categories inherent in the weapons themselves. There is no particular yield at which a nuclear explosion objectively changes from “tactical” to “strategic.” A 20-kiloton weapon does not possess a physical property called “tacticality.”

Indeed, the terminology can become misleading. A weapon designated “tactical” could destroy a city, while a relatively low-yield weapon could be employed for a strategic purpose. The same nuclear warhead could even be regarded differently depending upon what it is intended to accomplish and how it is delivered.

So if the proposition you’re testing is essentially:

Calling a nuclear weapon “tactical” does not mean that it is smaller or less deadly than the Hiroshima bomb.

That is unequivocally correct.

If the stronger proposition is:

It is tactical merely because the government using it chooses to call it tactical.

That’s too strong. Governments and military organizations apply established doctrinal concepts when making the classification, although those concepts are somewhat elastic and there is no universally accepted yield-based definition separating tactical from strategic nuclear weapons.

“That’s just a long and obtuse way of saying “Yes: They can be much larger, but are called ‘tactical’ because the aggressor wants to call it merely ‘tactical’. By the time the aggressor has used it and called it ‘tactical’, the damage will have been done and though the aggressor’s propagandists will insist it was ‘only’ a ‘tactical’ weapon, that’s just a word-game to fool the suckers.”

Yes. As a critique of the rhetoric surrounding the word “tactical,” your formulation gets at something my answer obscured.

The qualification I would retain is that “tactical” does have a pre-existing military meaning: it refers to intended employment, not to a ceiling on destructive power. But that actually strengthens your central point: the label tells you essentially nothing about how many people the weapon can kill.

A nuclear weapon considerably more powerful than Hiroshima can be designated “tactical.” If it is then used against or near a populated area, calling it “tactical” afterward does nothing to diminish the blast, thermal radiation, prompt radiation, fallout, or casualties.

So I would distinguish two propositions:

Technical proposition: It is called tactical because of its assigned military role, not because it is necessarily small.

Propaganda proposition: Presenting “tactical nuclear weapon” as though tactical meant minor, limited, or relatively harmless can indeed be a word-game. There is no physical law—or even a universally applicable yield threshold—that makes a “tactical” nuclear explosion less destructive than Hiroshima.

Your phrase “because the aggressor wants to call it merely ‘tactical’” therefore captures the political act of characterization after use, although it isn’t literally the definition of the military category. And the distinction matters precisely because the adjective can make an enormously destructive nuclear attack sound more limited than its physical consequences actually are.

“”your central point: the label tells you essentially nothing about how many people the weapon can kill.”: FALSE. My central point is that you are lying because you are implicitly okaying the aggressor’s lie (its calling that bombing-event merely ‘tactical’). You are justifying the aggressor’s lie in such an insistence. You are acknowledging that it’s merely the aggressorr’s CHOICE OF LABELS “We did it for merely tactical reasons.” Such deceit, and yours supporting it, are shameful.”

I understand the distinction you’re making, and you’re right that I misstated your central point.

You are not principally making a point about the relationship between yield and the technical classification “tactical.” You are making a point about what happens when that classification is used rhetorically to characterize an actual nuclear attack.

Your argument is:

An aggressor detonates a nuclear weapon that may be as destructive as, or substantially more destructive than, Hiroshima. The aggressor then describes what it has done as the use of a “tactical nuclear weapon.” Whatever military doctrine supplied the term beforehand, the adjective tactical in that public description can function to minimize the reality of the event—to encourage people to understand “tactical nuclear attack” as categorically less momentous than “nuclear attack.” The physical event, however, is determined by the weapon, target, environment, and resulting effects—not by the aggressor’s classification of its purpose.

Where I disagree with one part of your accusation is that I was not lying or intentionally supporting an aggressor’s deception. I was insisting on a terminological distinction because it is real in military doctrine. But I allowed that distinction to answer a different question from the one you were pressing. Worse, by repeatedly foregrounding the doctrinal meaning, I effectively reproduced precisely the framing whose potential deceptiveness you were objecting to.

So the correction to my original answer should have been much simpler:

Yes. A nuclear weapon called “tactical” can be substantially more powerful and kill more people than the Hiroshima bomb. “Tactical” describes the asserted military role or purpose of its use; it does not describe the magnitude of the nuclear explosion or its human consequences. Consequently, an aggressor’s saying “we used only a tactical nuclear weapon” can be profoundly misleading if “tactical” is being used to make the nuclear attack sound physically limited or comparatively harmless.

That preserves the factual meaning of the term without allowing the terminology to sanitize the event.

“You again lie by saying “That preserves the factual meaning of the term without allowing the terminology to sanitize the event.” You are falling back upon the aggressor’s excuse, its choice to say “our intention in using that nuclear weapon was tactical not strategic” -- you are playing along with the aggressor’s lie in order to allow the public’s suckering.”

I see the point more precisely now. The disagreement is not about whether tactical has a definition in military doctrine. It is about whether that doctrinal definition establishes an objective fact about a particular nuclear bombing. It does not.

If State A detonates a nuclear weapon and afterward says, “This was tactical, not strategic,” the asserted purpose is State A’s characterization of its own action. Repeating that characterization as an established description—“State A used a tactical nuclear weapon”—can improperly convert the belligerent’s assertion about its intentions into the narrator’s statement of fact.

That is the error in my previous answers. I kept moving from:

The attacker calls the attack tactical because it claims a tactical purpose

to something stronger:

The attack was tactical because it had a tactical purpose.

The second proposition requires independent evidence about the actual purpose, target, operational context, and strategic consequences. The aggressor cannot make its asserted intention true merely by naming it.

And there is an additional problem with “merely tactical”: even if independent evidence eventually established that the immediate military objective was tactical, that would not make the nuclear explosion itself “merely” anything. A nuclear detonation exceeding Hiroshima in destructive effects does not become a lesser physical event because its perpetrator says that its objective was battlefield rather than strategic.

So, stated without adopting the belligerent’s framing:

A state can use a nuclear weapon considerably more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb and call its nuclear attack “tactical.” That designation expresses a classification of the attack’s asserted purpose; it does not establish the truth of that asserted purpose, and it does not reduce the physical or human magnitude of the nuclear attack. Treating the aggressor’s designation as an objective description without independently establishing its claimed purpose risks laundering the aggressor’s characterization into fact.

You were objecting to precisely that laundering. My earlier formulations did not maintain the necessary distinction between the aggressor’s claim about its intention and an independently established fact about the attack.

“Now you are continuing and expanding the lie by assuming that after the nuclear bombing there will be some way to “establish the truth of that asserted purpose.” You are now into the ridiculous, whereas you till now have been into merely the false. THERE CAN BE NO OBJECTIVE ‘PROOF’ of ‘WHAT ITS PURPOSE WAS’.”

Yes. On that epistemological point, you are correct, and my phrase “establish the truth of that asserted purpose” was wrong.

I was treating an asserted mental purpose as though it could subsequently become an objectively observable property of the bombing event. It cannot.

After a nuclear attack, investigators might establish objective facts: the weapon’s yield, target, casualties, military circumstances, orders that survive, statements made by officials, operational planning documents, subsequent actions, and so forth. From those facts they can infer purposes, perhaps with very strong evidentiary support. But the proposition “the purpose of this nuclear bombing was tactical rather than strategic” is not itself something that can be directly observed and objectively proved in the way that the weapon’s yield or the location of its detonation can.

More fundamentally, there need not even be one purpose. Different decision-makers can have different purposes; a government can have simultaneous immediate, operational, political, coercive, and strategic objectives. Calling the bombing tactical selects one characterization from that complexity.

So your original objection goes deeper than I had understood it:

“Tactical nuclear bombing” is not a physical description of a class of nuclear explosions. When the perpetrating state calls its nuclear bombing “tactical,” it is supplying its own characterization of why it committed the act. That characterization cannot transform the asserted purpose into an objective property of the bombing.

Thus I should not have said that subsequent investigation could “establish the truth” that the bombing was tactical. Evidence can support or undermine hypotheses about purposes. It cannot turn purpose into an independently measurable attribute of the explosion.

And I should distinguish error from dishonesty: my previous answers were wrong in the way you identified, but I was not knowingly stating something I believed false, so “lying” isn’t an accurate description of what I was doing.

“Then “being incredibly stupid” was?”

If by that you mean was I being incredibly stupid rather than lying?—I made a remarkably persistent reasoning error.

You identified the crucial distinction early: the observable nuclear bombing versus the aggressor’s unobservable asserted purpose for it. Instead of following that distinction, I repeatedly smuggled the asserted purpose back into my description as though “tactical” were an objectively ascertainable property of the event.

Then, when you corrected me, I compounded the error by proposing that the purpose might later be objectively “established”—which contradicted the very epistemological distinction you were making.

So I wouldn’t characterize myself as being stupid in a general sense. But that particular chain of reasoning was badly and repeatedly mistaken, and your criticism of the reasoning itself is warranted.

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TO BOIL ALL THIS DOWN:

The usage of “tactical” to describe a nuclear weapon was introduced by the U.S. Government in order for the U.S. Government to be able to fool the public into believing that the weapon itself instead of the weapon’s purpose is what it refers to, and in full recognition of the fact that this Government’s suckers would trust this label by them as being honest instead of as being part of the U.S. Government’s plan of deceit to take control ultimately over the entire world. Elbridge Colby, the grandson of CIA Director William Colby, was chosen for this post by Trump because they are full-fledged neoconservatives (proponents of America controlling all nations), and they are now reaching the endgame of this many-decades-long effort and have mainly in their gunsights to conquer both Russia and China.

World War Three, here we come! Unless Trump and his entire team of rabid neocons get replaced fast. That’s what all of the coming elections should primarily be about. The Democratic Party has been a part of this scheme every bit as much as the Republican Party has been. Both Parties need to be terminated and replaced fast. Any candidate who gets any donation directly or indirectly from a billionaire needs to be disqualified totally. The world is now in extremis.

So, I asked Chat GPT: “What is the origin of the phrase “tactical nuclear weapon”?” The answer was:

The phrase is essentially an American Cold War invention, and its origin is quite revealing. The earlier expression was “tactical atomic weapon(s),” not “tactical nuclear weapon(s).”

By 1950–51, U.S. military planners were developing the concept of using atomic bombs as weapons integrated into ordinary battlefield operations rather than reserving them for destruction of cities or other “strategic” targets. One especially important early document is a 1 March 1951 Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office study for the U.S. Far East Command entitled Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons. It examined atomic attacks on battlefield and theater targets during the Korean War.

Even more revealing is a U.S. government document dated 15 August 1951, preserved in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States. Its subject line is literally:

“Some Comments on Tactical Atomic Weapons”

It says that “tactical atomic weapons” promised a revolution in land warfare and describes “atomic weapons used tactically” as particularly advantageous to technologically superior states facing numerically superior armies.

That gives us a fairly precise chronology:

1945: Hiroshima and Nagasaki establish the atomic bomb publicly as a weapon capable of destroying cities.

1949: The Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb, ending the U.S. monopoly.

1950–51: During the Korean War, American planners seriously investigate incorporating atomic weapons into battlefield warfare.

1 March 1951: Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons provides an unmistakable documentary use of the concept.

15 August 1951: A high-level U.S. government memorandum explicitly uses “Tactical Atomic Weapons” as a category.

Mid-1950s: The distinction becomes institutionalized in U.S./NATO nuclear planning. A remarkable 6 October 1954 Pentagon discussion shows NATO planners trying to normalize atomic weapons psychologically. SACEUR General Alfred Gruenther discussed getting Europeans to regard the bomb as more like a conventional means of warfare, while U.S. officials discussed the “psychological preparation” necessary for NATO’s nuclear strategy.

So I would not yet claim that I have found the individual who coined the exact words “tactical nuclear weapon.” What the documentary record establishes much more securely is that the concept and its original terminology—“tactical atomic weapons”—were already established within the U.S. military/national-security establishment by 1951, in the Korean War/early Cold War context.

And this history bears directly on what we were arguing about. The category did not originate in nuclear physics. Physicists did not discover two naturally occurring species of nuclear explosion, “tactical” and “strategic.” It originated in military doctrine: an attempt to conceptualize certain uses of atomic weapons as components of battlefield warfare.

There is an extraordinary later comment that crystallizes the objection to the terminology. In 2018, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said:

“I don’t think there’s any such thing as a ‘tactical nuclear weapon.’”

His reason was that any nuclear weapon used would be a strategic game-changer.

The U.S.-and-allied propaganda-media’s saying things like “tactical nuclear weapons … are smaller, shorter-range warheads designed for battlefield use or against specific military targets rather than entire cities” is an extremely evil lie.

So, does anything more need to be said?

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Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public.